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DO FREEGANS COMMIT THEFT? 
 
Dr Sean Thomas 
Anglia Ruskin University 
 
The environmental impact of mass consumerism is a growing concern, with a 
particular consequence being the production of significant levels of waste goods.  
Goods are often disposed of whilst still being useable.  One proposed method of 
reducing the environmental impact of the levels of waste of useable goods is 
freeganism.  This paper provides an overview of freeganism, followed by an 
evaluation of the impact of English criminal law on freeganism.  This paper will 
consider the claim that freegans commit theft.  First there is analysis of the possibility 
that freegans cannot be guilty of theft because they only deal with abandoned 
property.  Although there is considerable strength in this claim, the difficulties with 
establishing that property is abandoned necessitates the development of an alternative 
defence.  It will be suggested that freeganism is not an activity that is dishonest in a 
way so as to attract criminal sanction.  This argument is based on the structure of the 
criminal law relating to theft, which has defences based on claims of right, subjective 
honesty, and the considerations of ordinary people (ie jury members).  It is concluded 
that freegans should not be guilty of theft under the current English criminal law. 
                                               

 Senior Lecturer in Law, Anglia Ruskin University.  The author would like to thank Dr Carolyn 
Abbot, Mr Andrew Bell, Dr Ruth Wadman, and the anonymous reviewers for all their useful 
comments.  An early version of this article was presented at a Work in Progress Session at the 
University of Manchester in 2008.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Freeganism is an alternative consumption strategy which involves taking goods that 
appear abandoned, without paying for them.  The freeganism concept is discussed in 
depth below in Part 2.  This article will assess whether freegans commit a property 
offence, specifically theft.  In Part 3 I will show that freeganism cannot be considered 
to be theft.  The first argument concerns the nature of the ownership interest in the 
relevant goods.  I will show that there is a possibility, even taking into account the 
restrictive nature of the doctrine, that the goods had been abandoned.  The second 
DUJXPHQWZKLFKLVPRUHSHUVXDVLYHFRQFHUQVWKHIUHHJDQ¶VVWDWHRIPLQGI argue 
that freegans are not doing anything so dishonest as to attract a criminal sanction.  
Part 4 is a conclusion. 
2. FREEGANISM 
Freeganism is not a coherent philosophy, nor does it have a consistent theoretical 
basis.1  It can however be loosely characterised as an anti-consumerist movement, 
                                               
1
 :6NLGHOVN\µ7KHIUHHJDQV¶FUHHGZDVWHQRWZDQWQRW¶The Observer (London 19 July 2009) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/19/freegan-environment-foodLWLVDQµLOO-defined 
activity « [without] any one clear sWDWHPHQWRIWKHLUDLPVDQGPRWLYDWLRQV¶On freeganism, see 
generally the information available at http://www.freegan.org.uk; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freeganism; http://freegan.info/; http://freegan.org.uk/.  See A Weissman 
µ(YHU\GD\5HYROXWLRQV3UDFWLFHVDQG,QVWLWXWLRQVIRU/LYLQJ%H\RQG&DSLWDOLVPLQ(YHU\GD\/LIH¶DW
http://freegan.info/?page_id=174), text accompanying fn 30 ± fn 48 for links to various examples of 
freeganism.  See also in general the media links page at http://freegan.info/?page_id=50.  There are 
also newspaper articles describing freeganist behaviour in England, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2007/aug/19/foodanddrink.ethicalfood; 
http://www.dailyecho.co.uk/news/features/living/3961963.Freeganism___making_use_of_things_shop
s_throw_away/; 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/2793564/Dumpster-diving-with-
the-freegans-Why-pay-for-food.html.  (All URLs cited throughout this article were accessible on 21 
July 2009.) 
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where the market economy is avoided where possible.  The reasons for this avoidance 
can vary.  Freegans often tend towards a left-wing political ideology which supports a 
general opposition to capitalism,2 although there are exceptions.3  Others may become 
freegans in opposition to the considerable waste that is produced by consumer culture, 
in particular the food waste produced by supermarkets.4  Although the multifaceted 
nature of freeganism prohibits an exhaustive definition, it is the aim of this article to 
analyse freegan practice. 
 
)UHHJDQVHPSOR\µstrategies for living based on limited participation in the 
FRQYHQWLRQDOHFRQRP\DQGPLQLPDOFRQVXPSWLRQRIUHVRXUFHV¶5  Although 
freeganism is rooted in veganism and vegetarianism,  6 there is no restriction of 
frHHJDQLVPWRIRRGVWXIIVDOOW\SHVRIJRRGVFDQEH³IUHHJDQLVHG´5HJDUGOHVVRI
whether the goods are organic or inorganic, all the goods that a freegan will be 
interested in have a common element: they reach a point of obsolescence.  The point 
of obsolescence will vary for inherent technological or organic reasons,7 but different 
peoSOHFDQDQGGRSODFHGLIIHUHQW³end-use points´ to the same goods.  Freegans will 
                                               
2
 See eg http://freegan.info/, where the front page of the website provides a variety of anti-consumerist 
and leftist descriptions of and MXVWLILFDWLRQVIRUIUHHJDQLVPVXFKDVWKLVµ)UHHJDQLVPLVDWRWDOER\FRWW
of an economic system where the profit motive has eclipsed ethical considerations and where 
massively complex systems of productions ensure that all the products we buy will have detrimental 
impacts most of which we may never even consider.  Thus, instead of avoiding the purchase of 
products from one bad company only to support another, we avoid buying anything to the greatest 
GHJUHHZHDUHDEOH¶ 
3
 /-6WUDKLOHYLW]µ7KH5LJKWWR $EDQGRQ¶-RKQ02OLQ/DZ	(FRQRPLFV:RUNLQJ3DSHU1R
(February 2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348211DWSWH[WWRIQµ$VDWHVWDPHQWWR
the prevalence of abandonment, it appears that some of these freegans are able to live essentially 
pleasant, middle-FODVVOLYHV¶ 
4
 See generally T Stuart Waste: Uncovering the Global Food Scandal (Penguin: London 2009).  Stuart 
ZDVWKHVXEMHFWRIDUHFHQWQHZVSDSHUIHDWXUH:6NLGHOVN\µ7KHIUHHJDQV¶FUHHGZDVWHQRWZDQWQRW¶
The Observer (London 19 July 2009) http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/19/freegan-
environment-food.  
5
 http://freegan.info/.  
6
 See eg http://freegan.info/QRWLQJWKDWWKHWHUPµIUHHJDQ¶DSSHDUVWREHDSRUWPDQWHDXRIµIUHH¶DQG
µYHJDQ¶6HHDOVRhttp://www.freegan.org.uk/ukfreegans/?page_id=6, describing meat-eating freegans 
DVµPHDJDQV¶ 
7
 See eg S Strasser Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash (New York: Henry Holt, 2000) pp 191-
201, pp 274-278 (discussing planned obsolescence); J Scanlan On Garbage (London: Reaktion Books, 
2005) p 34. 
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FRQVLGHUWKH³HQG-XVHSRLQW´WREHDWDODWHUSRLQWLQWKHREMHFW¶V³OLIH-VSDQ´FRPSDUHG
with non-freegans.  This willingness to use goods others deem obsolete provides a 
basis for freeganism.  In addition to this, the aim of freeganism is to obtain goods 
without having to pay for them.  This can occur through many methods, such as 
barter.8  However, one particular freegan practice has provoked media interest in the 
µsensational¶9 ³ELQ-GLYLQJ´  It is this particular practice which is the focus of this 
analysis. 
 
One freegan website gives the following description of bin-diving:  
 
µ3HUKDSVWKHPRVW notorious freegan strategy is what is commonly called 
³XUEDQIRUDJLQJ´RU³GXPSVWHUGLYLQJ´7KLVWHFKQLTXHLQYROYHVUXPPDJLQJ
through the garbage of retailers, residences, offices, and other facilities for 
XVHIXOJRRGV'HVSLWHRXUVRFLHW\¶V>VWHUHRW\Ses] about garbage, the goods 
recovered by freegans are safe, useable, clean, and in perfect or near-perfect 
condition, a symptom of a throwaway culture that encourages us to constantly 
replace our older goods with newer ones, and where retailers plan high-
volume product disposal as part of their economic model.  Some urban 
foragers go at it alone, others dive in groups, but we always share the 
discoveries openly with one another and with anyone along the way who 
ZDQWVWKHP¶10 
 
                                               
8
 This will cover the Freecycle movement, where individuals post notices on the internet that goods are 
free for those who are willing to pick them up.  See eg http://www.uk.freecycle.org/.  
9
 http://freegan.org.uk/pages/faq.php#10. 
10
 http://freegan.info/.  For a distinction between garbage (animal and vegetable matter) and rubbish, 
trash and refuse (all other types of waste) see eg Strasser, above n 7, p 29 at fn *.  For reasons of clarity 
this distinction is not maintained herein. 
 5 
This analysis is restricted to bin-diving, which is defined for these purposes as where 
someone takes goods, which have been disposed of as rubbish, out of the receptacle 
containing them, for further use, ie personal consumption.   
 
There are various arguments for and against allowing freeganism in general and bin-
diving in particular.  On one hand, it is arguable that if the owner of goods wishes to 
dispose of them as rubbish, then that wish should not be interfered with.  The right to 
DOLHQDWHRQH¶VVHOIIURPJRRGVLVDQLQFLGHQWRIWhe rights of ownership,11 and it is 
arguable that that right extends beyond the mere privilege of disposal by imposing a 
duty on others not to interfere with the result of the disposal ie waste.  Such an 
extended duty may be justified on environmental grounds, or on privacy grounds.  
These issues will be discussed in turn. 
 
Environmental justifications may be put forward as both prohibiting and supporting 
the practice of bin-diving.  If the rubbish is environmentally unsound, then there is a 
rational public policy justification for restricting access to that rubbish,12 based on the 
general duty not to harm others.13  This manifests itself effectively in a prohibition on 
abandonment of things where the act of abandonment would have a negative 
                                               
11
 See eg $0+RQRUpµ2ZQHUVKLS¶LQ$**XHVWHGOxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: OUP, 
1965) pp 107-147, at p 118.  There is of course controversy concerning the application of this right to 
cultural treasures (see eg J L Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in 
Cultural Treasures (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999)), but freegans will be concerned 
with foodstuffs, not paintings. 
12
 Hudson uses this argument to justify the decision in R v Edwards and Stacey (1877) 13 Cox CC 384: 
see A H Hudson, µ,V'LYHVWLQJ$EDQGRQPHQW3RVVLEOH DW&RPPRQ/DZ"¶/45IQ
42: µ3ROLF\FRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIDVSHFWVRIKHDOWKFOHDUO\XQGHUOD\WKHGHFLVLRQ¶/DWHULQµ$EDQGRQPHQW¶
in N Palmer and E MacKendrick (eds) Interests in Goods (London: LLP, 2nd edn, 1998) p 604 this 
rationalisation was simplified down to µREYLRXVUHDVRQVRISROLF\¶Edwards and Stacey (discussed 
further below, text following n 100) involved the theft of three dead pigs that had been buried as they 
had been bitten by a mad dog.  
13
 See eg Honoré, above n 11, p 123.  
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environmental effect (ie pollution or rubbish),14 EHFDXVHµWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKH
HQYLURQPHQWLVDFROOHFWLYHJRRG¶15  This is particularly important for the bin-diving 
situation.  A freegan takes goods that have been disposed of in order to re-use them 
(or in the case of foodstuffs, put to good initial use).  Otherwise, the goods would be 
disposed in a manner that may well constitute an environmental cost,16 and thus bin-
diving is justifiable as a means of reducing the environmental impact of a consumer 
culture by increasing the efficient use of goods.17  However, this fails to fully deal 
with cases where goods are disposed of because they are actually dangerous.  
Nevertheless, freegans will not be attempting to acquire goods that have been 
disposed of because they are dangerous to health, on the contrary the underlying 
rationale of freeganism, and bin-diving specifically, is that the goods that have been 
thrown out are perfectly safe and usable.18  Freegans who bin-dive for food often 
justify their actions because food is often disposed of for what are essentially 
economic or regulatory reasons, rather than specific health and safety reasons.  The 
food may be aesthetically unappealing and thus unsellable whilst remaining perfectly 
edible, or it may have reached a pre-RUGDLQHGµVHOl-E\GDWH¶ZKLOVWUHPDLQLQJVDIHWR
eat.  The same logic would also apply to bin-diving for obsolete electronic goods, for 
example.  Consequently, it could be said that the environmental argument against bin-
diving fails to justify a prohibition of the practice, and it could further be argued that 
the environmental argument in favour of bin-diving is a valid one.19  
                                               
14
 J E Penner The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) pp 79-80. 
15
 Ibid, 79. 
16
 See generally Stuart, above n 4. 
17
 See eg +XGVRQµ$EDQGRQPHQW¶Dbove n 12, p 614. 
18
 This issue, and the ones that follow in the main text, were all raised by Tristram Stuart, a freegan and 
author, in Skidelsky, above n 4.  
19
 It should be noted at this point that there is a specific offence of interfering with waste receptacles 
under the Environmental Protection Act 1990, s 60.  However, as the focus of this article is the 
assessment of whether a freegan bin-diver commits the offence of theft, the s 60 offence can be 
disregarded for the sake of economy and clarity.  It is worth noting though that the existence of a 
regulatory offence of this nature does not demonstrate that the environmental justifications for bin-
 7 
 
Bin-diving may be objectionable on the grounds of privacy.  In Williams v Phillips,20 
the defendant was a refuse collector who had taken for himself an object he had found 
in a rubbish bin, and he was convicted of larceny.  This case is discussed in depth 
below,21 but it is worth noting at this point as Ormerod and Williams have argued that 
that decision could be justified on the grounds of privacyµThe availability of theft 
charges in such circumstances is important in dealing with those who rummage 
through the refuse of celebrities for information to sell to tabloid newspapers, and 
those who appropriate confidential industrial or financial inforPDWLRQIURPUHIXVH¶22  
Yet this argument may well only cover cases of bin-GLYLQJIURPLQGLYLGXDOV¶ELQVDV
it is highly unlikely that a supermarket or restaurant will be disposing of information 
in the same bins they disposes of waste foodstuffs.  If there is a disposal of 
information, by accident or design, it is difficult to translate the aims of freegan bin-
diving ± the acquisition and reuse of viable goods ± into an urge to acquire 
confidential information.    So even if a freegan acquired an obsolete computer which 
VWLOOFRQWDLQHGGDWDLWLVWKHJRRGV¶LQKHUHQW³XVH-YDOXH´ZKLFKDWWUDFWVWKHIUHHJDQ
and the data would be an irrelevance.  The clear gulf between information and 
tangible goods means that the privacy argument cannot apply to cases of freegan bin-
diving. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
diving put forward by freegans are in any way incorrect.  It is, as is implied by the text accompanying 
this footnote, a question of balance. 
20
 (1957) 41 Cr App R 5. 
21
 See text following n 103. 
22
 D Ormerod and D H Williams 6PLWK¶V/DZRI7KHIW (Oxford: OUP, 9th edn, 2007) (hereafter 
µ6PLWK¶V/DZRI7KHIW¶>@IQ)RUDQLQWHUHVWLQJGLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVDFWRIµJDUERORJ\¶D
portmanteau of archaeology and garbage), see Scanlan, above n 7, pp 142-153. 
 8 
The privacy argument against taking rubbish from bins has been dealt with by the 
Supreme Court of the United States of America, in California v Greenwood.23  That 
case involved an XQZDUUDQWHGVHDUFKRI*UHHQZRRG¶VUXEELVKZKLFKKDGEHHQ
wrapped in a plastic bag and deposited on the side of the street for collection by the 
relevant authority.  Giving the opinion of the majority (by six to two, with one 
abstention) Justice White held that there was no need for a warrant to search rubbish 
lefWLQVXFKDFDVH+HIXUWKHUVWDWHGWKDWµ,WLVFRPPRQNQRZOHGJHWKDWSODVWLF
garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, 
FKLOGUHQVFDYHQJHUVVQRRSVDQGRWKHUPHPEHUVRIWKHSXEOLF¶24  It is intuitive ± a 
µJXWIHHOLQJ¶± that even though property has been placed in receptacles with the final 
aim of disposal by authorities charged with such a task, such property has essentially 
been abandoned by the original owner.  As Hudson clearly puts it: 
 
µ7KHJUHDWDGYDntage of recognising divesting abandonment, a point clearly 
appreciated by the Roman jurists, is that the law more closely coincides with 
WKHRUGLQDU\SHUVRQ¶VUHDOLVWLFDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHW\SHVRIVLWXDWLRQZKLFK
bring it into play and, especially in criminal law, it avoids the need to contort 
the law by providing devious explanations for non-liability in situations which 
FRXOGPRUHVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\EHFDOOHGFDVHVRIGLYHVWLQJDEDQGRQPHQW¶25 
 
In a recent article in the Southern Daily Echo,26 two freegans based in the South of 
England were interviewed.  Paul, one of the freegans, provided an illuminating 
                                               
23
 (1988) 486 US 35. 
24
 California v Greenwood 486 US 35, 40 (1988). 
25
 +XGVRQµ$EDQGRQPHQW¶DERYHQ 12, p 613. 
26
 Available at 
http://www.dailyecho.co.uk/news/features/living/3961963.Freeganism___making_use_of_things_shop
s_throw_away/. 
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evaluation of the freegan position: µ7KHZD\ZHVHHLWLVLI\RXSXWVRPHWKLQJLQWKH
ELQ\RXGRQ¶WZDQWLWDQ\PRUH<RXKDYHUHOLQTXLVKHG\RXUUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRULW¶27   
 
It may be argued, as Dixon CJ has done so, that µ[i]ntuitive feelings for justice seem a 
poor substitute for a rule antecedently known, more particularly where all do not have 
the same intuition.¶28  Yet it is submitted that the intuitive feeling, that goods disposed 
of as rubbish are abandoned, is highly persuasive.  Furthermore, the effect of such 
feelings is of particular importance for the question at the heart of this article: do 
freegans commit theft?  As will be shown,29 the effect of the current law on 
dishonesty is such that the intuitive feelings of jury members, and of freegan bin-
divers themselves, can be determining factors in assessing whether a bin-diver is 
dishonest and thus whether he is guilty of theft.  As Hudson put it, the µRUGLQDU\
SHUVRQ¶VUHDOLVWLFDSSUHFLDWLRQ¶is extremely significant when considering the 
(dis)honesty a freegan accused of stealing goods from a bin. 
3. FREEGANISM AND THEFT 
Freeganism does not involve a transaction, such as a sale, between a freegan and the 
person throwing out the rubbish.30  Therefore, questions over the ownership of the 
JRRGVFRQFHUQHGFDQTXLFNO\DULVH%HFDXVHWKHIWWDNHVµWDNHVRZQHUVKLSDQGLWV
                                               
27
 A similar approach can be seen in a comment to an article on freeganism on the Telegraph website 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/2793564/Dumpster-diving-with-
the-freegans-Why-pay-for-food.htmlZKLFKVWDWHVWKLVµZKDW¶VWKHSUREOHPZLWK)Ueeganism?  If you 
throw something away, you give up your right to call it yours, If someone else can use it, good luck to 
WKHP¶3DJHVFUHHQVKRWVDYHGE\DXWKRUDYDLODEOHRQUHTXHVW 
28
 National Insurance Co of New Zealand v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569, 572 (Dixon CJ), cited in D 
:(OOLRWWµ'LVKRQHVW\LQ7KHIW$GLVSHQVDEOHFRQFHSW¶>@&ULP/5S 
29
 3(b) Dishonesty. 
30
 7KHUHFDQQRWEHDVDOHZKLFKUHTXLUHVµPRQH\FRQVLGHUDWLRQFDOOHGWKH SULFH¶6DOHRI*RRGV$FW
1979, s 2(1).  More fundamentally, there is no contract between the relevant parties. 
 10 
IDFHWVDVDQD[LRP¶31 it is arguable that a freegan may be susceptible to a conviction 
for theft.  On the frequently asked questions page of the UK based freegan website, 
freegan.org.uk, the following is stated:   
 
µ5DLGLQJELQVIURPWKHEDFNRIVXSHUPDUNHWVLVDOHJDOO\JUH\DUHD,I
supermarkets want to be difficult, they could charge you with trespassing, or 
even with stealing, in certain cases.  It is ironic to hear a store manager claim 
³+H\\RXFDQ¶WVWHDORXUUXEELVK´:HKDYHKHDUGWKDWOHJDOO\-speaking, if 
you take something which someone does not value then it is not stealing.  It 
makes sense that if we throw something away, we relinquish ownership of it.  
,WVKRXOGWKHQEHFRPHDXWRPDWLFDOO\DYDLODEOHIRUDQ\RQHWRPDNHXVHRI«
To our knowledge no one has ever been charged in the UK with stealing 
rubbish.  It is likely that this is because supermarkets realise that prosecuting 
VRPHRQHIRUUHF\FOLQJZDVWHZRXOGRSHQXSDQHWKLFDOFDQRIZRUPV¶32 
 
This statement illustrates the confusion, particularly for freegans, over the legality of 
bin-diving.  It is the purpose of this article to shed some light on the criminal status of 
freegans who bin-dive. 
 
The offence of theft,33 defined in the Theft Act 1968, s 1(1), has five elements which 
have EHHQEURDGO\LQWHUSUHWHGVXFKWKDWµ>W@KHRIIHQFHRIWKeft is so wide, well 
                                               
31
 A P Simester and G R Sullivan Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 3rd 
HGQKHUHDIWHUµSimester and Sullivan¶441. 
32
 http://freegan.org.uk/pages/faq.php#11. 
33
 See generally A T H Smith Property Offences: the protection of property through the criminal law 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994); E Griew The Theft Acts 1968 & 1978 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
WKHGQKHUHDIWHUµGriew¶6PLWK¶V/DZRI7KHIW.  See also Simester and Sullivan, pp 441 et 
seq; D Ormerod Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law 2[IRUG283WKHGQKHUHDIWHUµSmith and 
Hogan¶FKV-29. 
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established and so uncontroversial in practice that very few issues now arise on 
DSSHDO¶34  There must be property that is capable of being stolen ± it is clear that bin-
diving will involve property.35  The concept RIDSSURSULDWLRQLVµDVWRXQGLQJO\ZLGH¶,36 
and theUHLVQRGRXEWWKDWIUHHJDQVµDSSURSULDWH¶ goods they take from a bin.37  
Freegans will also intend to permanently deprive, in the sense that they will eat the 
food they find, or use the non-organic goods until they are no longer usable.  
However, it is suggested that bin-diving PLJKWZHOOEHRQHRIWKHµYHU\IHZLVVXHV¶
that might need appellate determination.  Two problems arise.  First, do the goods 
taken by the freegan, ie rubbish, belong to another?  This requires analysis of the law 
on abandonment.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, is a freegan dishonest?  
This article discusses these issues in depth. 
 
At this juncture there is value in drawing the boundaries of this article.  The analysis 
of abandonment is dealt with initially in order to demonstrate the basic rule, that 
abandoned goods cannot be stolen.  It will be shown that abandonment depends on 
YDULRXVIDFWRUVDQGWKDWWKHVHIDFWRUVHIIHFWLYHO\OLPLWWKHIUHHJDQ¶VDELOLW\WRVKRZ
that the goods have been abandoned.  Furthermore, it will be shown that the issues of 
abandonment and dishonesty dovetail together in cases such as bin-diving.  This 
moves the focus onto the issue of dishonesty, where it will be shown that a freegan 
has a better chance of avoiding a theft conviction by claiming he was not being 
dishonest. 
                                               
34
 6PLWK¶V/DZRI7KHIW [1.48].  This statement is clearly made in the context of whether the Fraud Act 
2006 will have an impact on the law of theft, but I believe it is an accurate description of theft. 
35
 It is assumed for the sake of economy that the goods taken by freegans constitute property that can 
be stolen under the provisions of the Theft Act 1968.   
36
 Simester and Sullivan, p 471.  See generally Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1972] 
AC 626, 632; R v Morris [1984] AC 320; R v Gomez [1993] AC 442, 464; R v Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241; 
5:LOOLDPVµ5HLQLQJLQWKH&RQFHSWRI$SSURSULDWLRQLQ7KHIW¶0RQDVK8/5HYSmith 
and Hogan, pp 733 et seq; Simester and Sullivan, pp 469-483; 6PLWK¶V/DZRI7KHIW, [2.08] et seq. 
37
 Cf Scanlan, above n 7Sµ$SSURSULDWLRQLVWKHPRWKHURIJDUEDJH¶ 
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(a) Theft and Abandonment38 
The Theft Act 1968, s VWDWHVWKDWµSURSHUW\VKDOOEHUHJDUGHGDVEHORQJLQJWRDQ\
person having possession or control of it, or having in it any proprietary right or 
LQWHUHVW¶From this abandonment can be defined: V has abandoned his goods when 
he no longer has possession or control over them, or any proprietary right or interest 
in them. 
 
TKHµvery purpose RIFULPLQDOLVLQJWKHIW¶LVWRSURWHFWWKHRZQHURIJRRGVIURPWKH
harm that results from a thief interfering with property rights and interests.39  This is a 
vital point.  If goods are abandoned, there is no possibility of a theft conviction.40  If 
WKHµWKLHI¶LVWKHRQO\SHUVRQZLWKDQ\LQWHUHVWLQWKHJRRGVWKHQKHFRXOGQRWKave 
stolen them.41  Instead the common-law rules of property acquisition will determine 
the ownership of the abandoned goods: the goods will become the property of the 
person who first repossesses them, ie the first person to reduce the goods to his 
control.42   
                                               
38
 For some reason it appears that there is an exponential growth in the literature on abandonment.  See 
JHQHUDOO\+XGVRQµ,V'LYHVWLQJ$EDQGRQPHQW3RVVLEOHDW&RPPRQ/DZ"¶ DQGµ$EDQGRQPHQW¶DERYH
n 125+LFNH\µ6WHDOLQJ$EDQGRQHG*RRGV3RVVHVVRU\7LWOHLQ3URFHHGLQJVIRU7KHIW¶/6
584; J Griffiths-%DNHUµ'LYHVWLQJ$EDQGRQPHQW$Q8QQHFHVVDU\&RQFHSW"¶&/:5/-
StrDKLOHYLW]µ7KH5LJKWWR$EDQGRQ¶-RKQ02OLQ/DZ	(FRQRPLFV:RUNLQJ3DSHU1R)HEUXDU\
2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348211).  There is also a useful overview in K Gray and S 
F Gray Elements of Land Law (Oxford: OUP, 5th edn, 2009) [1.2.69]-[1.2.79].  However, the issue of 
freeganism, and bin-diving in particular, is not dealt with in any depth in the literature. 
39
 Simester and Sullivan, p 452.  For the argument that the purpose of theft is actually to prohibit 
dishonest interferences and not interferences per se, see text accompanying n 174 ± n 177. 
40
 (OOHUPDQ¶V:LOVRQ/LQH/LPLWHGY:HEVWHU >@/OR\G¶V5HS; R v White (1912) 107 LT 528; 
R v Peters (1843) 1 Car & K 245; 174 ER 795; R v Reed (1842) Car & M 306; 174 ER 519. 
41
 See eg Buckley v Gross (1863) 3 B & S 566, 122 ER 213; Daniel v Rogers [1918] 2 KB 228, 234; 
Parker v British Airways Board [1989] QB 1004, 1009; Costello v Chief Constable of Derbyshire 
[2001] 1 All ER 150; R v Meredith [1973] Crim LR 253; cf R v Turner (No 2) [1971] 2 All ER 441; R v 
Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241. 
42
 Armory v Delamirie 6WU(56HHJHQHUDOO\&05RVHµ3RVVHVVLRQDVWKH
Origin RI3URSHUW\¶8&KL/5HY5$(SVWHLQµ3RVVHVVLRQDVWKH5RRWRI7LWOH¶
*D/5HY'5+DUULVµ3RVVHVVLRQ¶LQ$**XHVWHGOxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: 
OUP, 1961); F Pollock and R S Wright An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford: OUP, 
1888). 
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6RDOWKRXJKLWKDVEHHQVDLGWKDWµWKHactus reus of theft [has] reduced to vanishing 
SRLQW¶43 there is still one aspect of the actus of theft which has not past the event 
horizon.  Whether the goods actually belong to another person is essential to an 
assessment of the criminal nature of freeganism.  As abandoned goods cannot be 
stolen, analysis of the abandonment concept is necessary.44   
 
Allusions to the impossibility of abandonment exist,45 and abandonment can be 
GHVFULEHGDVµFRQWURYHUWHG¶.46  Nevertheless, there is a fundamental rational basis for 
the existence of a concept of abandonment.  Penner argues that it must be part of the 
RZQHU¶VULJKWWRGHWHUPLQHWKHXVHRIDWKLQJIRUWKHRZQHUWRGHWHUPLQHWKDWWKHWKLQJ
has no use (it may of course be of use WRDIUHHJDQRWKHUZLVHRQHLVµsaddled with a 
UHODWLRQVKLSWRDWKLQJWKDWRQHGRHVQRWZDQW¶47  6WUDKLOHYLW]WDNHV3HQQHU¶VDUJXPHQW
further, noting that it is related to the right to destroy,48 and that the right to abandon 
is an example of State-EDFNHGJXDUDQWHHDORQJWKHVHOLQHVµZHZLOODOORZ\RXWRULG
\RXUVHOIRIDUHVRXUFHUHJDUGOHVVRIZKDWDQ\RQHHOVHKDVWRVD\DERXWWKHPDWWHU¶49  
Furthermore, it is clear that there is there is sufficient guidance from the case-law that 
abandonment is possible.50  Thus it is taken as granted that abandonment is possible.  
                                               
43
 6PLWK¶V/DZRI7KHIW [2.11].  See also Griew [2.88].  That the actus reus of theft has disappeared is 
the consequence of the decisions of the House of Lords in R v Morris [1984] AC 320; R v Gomez 
[1993] AC 442, 464; R v Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241.   
44
 The necessity of analysing the common law rules concerning abandonment is clearly illustrated in 
Hickey, above n 38. 
45
 See eg Pollock and Wright, above n 42SDFTXLVLWLRQRIJRRGVFDQµSHUKDSV¶ occur following 
abandonment); Griffiths-Baker, above n 38. 
46
 A P Bell The Modern Law of Personal Property in England and Ireland (London: Butterworths, 
1989) p 36 fn 1.  R v Reed &DU	0(5&ROHULGJH-µDVXEMHFWRI
which man\SHRSOHDUHLJQRUDQW¶ 
47
 J E Penner The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) p 79. 
48
 6HHHJ/-6WUDKLOHYLW]µ7KH5LJKWWR'HVWUR\¶<DOH/- 
49
 L J Strahilevitz , above n 38, p 12, text following fn 49. 
50
 Hudson has persuasively shown that it is in fact decisions from the sphere of criminal law, rather 
than those of the civil courts, which prove that abandonment is possible in English common law: A H 
+XGVRQµ,V'LYHVWLQJ$EDQGRQPHQW3RVVLEOHDW&RPPRQ/DZ"¶, above n 12. 
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The real issue is whether abandonment has actually occurred in the particular 
situation.  In the next section the various factors that affect whether goods are 
abandoned will be considered.51  7KHVHDUHWKHYDOXHRIWKHJRRGVWKHRZQHU¶V
LQWHQWLRQWKHORFDWLRQRIWKHJRRGVDQGWKHILQGHU¶VLQWHQWLRQ7KHILQDOIDFWRU
GLVFXVVHGWKHILQGHU¶VLQWHQWLRQLVLPSRUWDQWDVLWLOOXVWUDWHVWKHGRYHWDLOLQJ
relationship between the abandonment concept and the dishonesty element of the 
offence of theft, and more importantly, it will provide evidence for the argument that 
DIUHHJDQ¶VFKDQFHVRIDYRLGLQJDWKHIWFRQYLFWLRQGHSHQGVPRUHRQKLVGLVKRQHVW\
than whether the goods are abandoned.  Following that is a close analysis of the effect 
of abandonment by disposal as rubbish,52 because the disposal of goods as rubbish is 
probably the fact-situation closest to the freeganist bin-diving scenario. 
(i) Abandonment  
$V/RUG*RGGDUG&-KDVVDLGµ\RXFannot be charged with stealing abandoned 
SURSHUW\¶53 but goods that are merely lost can be the subject of theft.54  Finding the 
boundary between abandonment and loss can be difficult not only in practice but also 
at a theoretical level, because various factors can determine the location of the 
boundary between abandonment and loss.  They are the value of the goods, the 
RZQHU¶VLQWHQWLRQWKHORFDWLRQRIWKHJRRGVDQGWKHILQGHU¶VLQWHQWLRQDQGWKH\VKDOO
be considered in turn. 
 
                                               
51
 3(a)(i)  Abandonment. 
52
 3(a)(ii)  Abandonment by disposal as rubbish.  
53
 (OOHUPDQ¶V:LOVRQ/LQH/LPLWHGY:HEVWHU >@/OR\G¶V5HS, 180.   
54
 On loss generally see eg -- µ3RVVHVVLRQRI³/RVW´*RRGV¶&RO/5HY-787; R W Aigler 
µ5LJKWVRI)LQGHUV¶0LFK/5HY'5HLVPDQµ3RVVHVVLRQDQGWKH/DZRI)LQGHUV¶
52 Harv L Rev 1105; 0-%R\OHDQG0+HFKWµ7KH5HWXUQRI/RVW3URSHUW\$FFRUGLQJWR-HZLVK	
&RPPRQ/DZ$&RPSDULVRQ¶-1996) 12 J Law and Religion 225. 
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Pollock and Wright describe DEDQGRQPHQWDVµWKHFDVHRIDSHUVRQTXLWWLQJSRVVHVVLRQ
without any specific intention of putting another person in his place (a case naturally 
H[FHSWLRQDOZLWKWKLQJVRIYDOXH¶55  The words in parentheses are important.  The 
difficulties regarding abandonment are in proportion to the value of the thing in 
question: it is much less likely that there can be an abandonment of a valuable thing 
than of a less valuable thing.56   
 
7KHUHLVFRQVLGHUDEOHVWUHQJWKLQWKH³YDOXHRIWKHJRRGV´DSSURDFKWRDEDQGRQPHQt.57  
In R v Peters,58 a case concerning the abandonment of jewellery, Rolfe B was willing 
to hold that the likelihood of abandonment of something is relative to the value of the 
thing abandoned: µ,I,KDGDQDSSOHDQGGURSSHGLWLWPLJKWEHSUHVXPHGWKDWI 
abandoned it; but if I drop £500, the presumption is, that I do not mean to abandon 
LW¶59  Over a century later, in a civil case the Court of Appeal had to consider, in 
Bentinck Ltd v Cromwell Engineering Co,60 whether a car had been abandoned.  The 
car had been acquired on hire-purchase, with the plaintiffs as financiers, and the 
defendants (the employers of the person who acquired the car) had signed an 
indemnity agreement.  The car was damaged in a crash, and then taken to a garage, 
where it was left.  The hirer, a Mr Faulkner, then disappeared.  Lord Denning MR 
held that the car had been abandoned.  He said the following: 
 
µWKHDEDQGRQPHQWWRHQWLWOHWKHILQDQFHFRPSDQ\WRUHWDNHSRVVHVVLRQPXVW
be abandonment of all rights in the car so as to evince quite clearly that the 
                                               
55
 Pollock and Wright, above n 42, p 44. 
56
 Ibid, p 44, p 183. 
57
 See also Strahilevitz, above n 38, pp 5-6.  Strahilevitz takes into account the subjective value of the 
goods as well as the market value. 
58
 (1843) 1 Car & K 245, 247; 174 ER 795. 
59
 Ibid, 247; 795. 
60
 [1971] 1 QB 324. 
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KLUHUQRORQJHUKDVDQ\LQWHUHVWLQLW7KHMXGJHKDVVRIRXQGLQWKLVFDVH«
That seems to me to be a reasonable inference from the facts of this case.  
Here was a car with all the costs running up.  Mr. Faulkner would not want to 
shoulder the liability.  +HGLVDSSHDUHGDOWRJHWKHU¶61 
 
This statement is a revealing one.  It could be argued that the fact that Mr Faulkner 
had taken it upon himself to disappear was the true basis for finding that the property 
was abandoned.  However, in much the same way that an individual can be the owner 
of goods even if he does not know of their immediate existence,62 then DQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
disappearance GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\PHDQWKDWDOORIWKDWSHUVRQ¶VSURSHUW\LV
abandoned.  From a practical perspective, the opposite position would create a 
nightmare with regard to goods owned by people who disappear.  The italicised words 
clearly indicate the strongest grounds for the conclusion that the property had been 
abandoned: the value of the car had rapidly decreased compared to the costs of 
owning the car. 
 
There is further support for this approach to understanding abandonment from the 
UHFHQWGHFLVLRQRIWKH6DVNDWFKHZDQ&RXUWRI4XHHQ¶V%HQFKLQStewart v Gustafson, 
ZKHUH.OHEXF-VWDWHGWKDWµDQLQWHQWLRQto abandon can be inferred from the very 
                                               
61
 Ibid, 328-329 (emphasis added).  The other judges, Fenton Atkinson LJ, and Cairns LJ, both agreed 
with Lord Denning MR (at 329 of the report).  The Court of Appeal decision in Dee Conservancy 
Board v McConnell [1928] 2 KB 159 appears at first sight to provide a very strict standard for the 
reasoning adopted by Lord Denning MR.  In the earlier case Scrutton LJ (at 163-164) said that if he 
FUDVKHGKLVFDURQWRVRPHRQH¶VODZQWKXVEORFNLQJWKHLUGULYHEHFDXVHRIKLVQHJOLJHQWGULYLQJµ>L@W
will be no answer to the claim by that person for the damage done to his lawn and the blocking of his 
drive, and for the expense incurred by him in removing the motor car which I had not removed, for me 
WRVD\³,DEDQGRQWKHFDU´¶+RZHYHUWKHDee Conservancy Board case concerned the law of wreck 
(which as Hudson has twice noted (see above n 12) provides an idiosyncratic set of rules on 
abandonment), and so can be distinguished.  Furthermore, the situation in Bentinck was substantially 
different as the abandoned car had not caused loss to a third party nor was it causing further loss. 
62
 See below, text accompanying n 72 ± n 74. 
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QDWXUHRIDFKDWWHO¶63  In that case, there was a quantity of lumber under dispute.  The 
OXPEHUZDVµZRUWKOHVV¶DQG.OHEXF-KHOGWKDWWKHILQGHUZDVµHQWLWOHGWRLQIHUWKDW
[the owner] had abandoned these chattels EHFDXVHRIWKHLUFKDUDFWHU¶64   
 
This approach has substantial significance for freegans, and in particular those 
freegans who engage in bin-diving for foodstuffs outside shops and restaurants.  Such 
goods are disposed of into bins by their owners because they have no economic value 
± if the goods have reached their sell-by date then their economic value has essentially 
reduced down to zero because they cannot be sold.  Bin-diving for foodstuffs is not 
the sole occupation of a freegan,65 but there is no reason why non-foodstuffs cannot 
DOVREHVXEMHFWWRWKLV³YDOXHRIWKHJRRGV´DSSURDFK,IWKHJRRGVFRQFHUQHGDUHQR
longer economically viable, say through technological obsolescence, it is that basic 
fact which leads to their abandonment.  It is further suggested that the value of the 
goods approach is in accordance with the intuitive feeling that people can have with 
regard to goods thrown away into bins ± that rubbish has no value.66 
 
Nevertheless, problems can arise for the bin-diver as the value of the goods approach 
does not cover all possible bin-diving scenarios.  What if the disputed goods are not 
completely economically worthless?  What if they are worthless, but retain some 
other (sentimental) value?  What if the goods have been disposed of by accident?   
 
                                               
63
 [1999] 4 WWR 696 [38]. 
64
 Ibid.  6HHDOVRDW>@µ$VWKHSUDFWLFDORUPRQHWDU\YDOXHRIDFKDWWHOLQFUHDVHVVRLQP\YLHZGRHV
WKHGLIILFXOW\RILQIHUULQJDEDQGRQPHQW¶6HHDOVRFidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co v Lehigh Valley Coal 
Co 143 A 474 (Penn 1928). 
65
 See above, text following n 6. 
66
 See above, text following n 23. 
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These questions can be dealt with by considering the intention of the owner.  If an 
owner intends to abandon the problems seem to dissipate, but if there is no such 
intention, and the owner merely regards the goods as lost, then the goods will not be 
considered abandoned.  The following definition of abandonment given by Simester 
and Sullivan is particularly helpful hereµ$EDQGRQPHQWRIRZQHUVKLSUHTXLUHVD
JLYLQJXSRIWKHRZQHU¶VSK\VLFDOFRQWURORIDQLWHPaccompanied by the cessation of 
any intention to possess that item and of any intention to exclude other persons from 
its possession ± ie DGHOLEHUDWHUHOLQTXLVKLQJRIDOOULJKWVRYHUWKHLWHP¶67  This 
DFFRUGVZLWKWKHQHJDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRIµEHORQJLQJWRDQRWKHU¶
noted above.68  Generally the loss of possession will be relatively easy to demonstrate.  
However, proving the owner had the necessary intention to give up the rights in the 
goods is a far more difficult task, particularly bearing in mind that it has not been 
determined with any certainty whether this intention is assessed subjectively or 
objectively.69   
 
In R v Woodman,70 a company owned a site and the contents of that site.  They left the 
site, and gave the Bird group of companies the right to remove metal from the site.  
The Bird group did so, but left behind some metal it deemed uneconomic to remove.  
The company then secured the site with fencing, and put up a notice prohibiting 
trespassers.  The defendant then came along some two years later, entered the site, 
and took the remaining metal.  He was convicted of theft, and appealed on the basis 
that the company which had run the site could not be said to be in control of the 
                                               
67
 Simester and Sullivan, pp 457 (emphasis added).  See also 6PLWK¶V/DZRI7KHIW >@µ,I>WKH
owner] intends to exclude others from [the goods], he does not abandon it, though it may be clear that 
KHLQWHQGVWRPDNHQRIXUWKHUXVHRILWKLPVHOI¶ 
68
 See above, text following n 38. 
69
 K Gray and S F Gray Elements of Land Law (Oxford: OUP, 5th edn, 2009) [1.2.78]. 
70
 [1974] QB 754. 
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property as they had been under the impression it had all been removed by the Bird 
group.  The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the control of the site sufficed to 
show that JRRGVRQWKHVLWHEHORQJHGWRWKHFRPSDQ\QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
ignorance of their existence.71 
 
This is not particularly controversial: it is a longstanding principle of property law 
that a person can own property that he does not know of.72  As Pollock states: µWKRXJK
an occupier may have no conscious specific intention concerning all the chattels in his 
house, or on his land, it is certainly his general intention that unauthorized persons 
VKDOOQRWPHGGOHZLWKWKHP¶73  What the Woodman decision demonstrates is that 
whilst an owner can abandon the physical possession without maintaining the 
intention to retain ownership, and this retained intention will remain overriding: µ7KH
fact that it could not be shown that [the owners of the site] were conscious of the 
existence of this or any particular scrap iron does not destroy the general principle that 
control of a site by excluding others from it is prima facie control of articles on the 
VLWHDVZHOO¶74   
 
An owner of land can have the necessary intent to control goods on said land, so as to 
SUHYHQWWKHILQGLQJRIDEDQGRQPHQWEXWWKHQDWXUHRIWKHRZQHU¶VFRQWURORIWKHODQG
is an important factor in assessing whether the land owner has the necessary intent to 
control goods.  Two situations can be disposed of quickly.  Those goods that are 
                                               
71
 Ibid, 758. 
72
 See eg O W Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1881) pp 216 et seq; Pollock and 
Wright, above n 42, pp 38-39; R v William Rowe (1859) Bell 93; 169 ER 1180; Elwes v Brigg Gas Co 
(1886) 33 Ch D 562; South Staffordshire Water Co v Sharman [1896] 2 QB 44 (on which see further A 
/*RRGKDUWµ7KUHH&DVHVRQ3RVVHVVLRQ¶LQEssays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931) pp 75-90); Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142. 
73
 Pollock and Wright, above n 42, p 39. 
74
 R v Woodman [1974] QB 754, 758 (Lord Widgery CJ).  See also (OOHUPDQ¶V:LOVRQ/LQH/LPLWHGY
Webster [1@/OR\G¶V5HS/RUG*RGGDUG&-LQRUGHUIRUDEDQGRQPHQWWREHIRXQGLW
KDVWREHVKRZQWKDWWKHRZQHUKDGµGHILQLWHO\DEDQGRQHGLWDQGGLGQRWLQWHQGWRUHWULHYHLW¶ 
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IRXQGRQWKHHPSOR\HU¶VSURSHUW\E\DQHPSOR\HHFRPHLQWRWKHSRVVHVVLRQRIWKH
employer.75  Furthermore, if goods are somehow attached to land, then they belong to 
the landowner.76  This leaves those cases where the goods are lying unattached to the 
land.  In such cases the landowner has two options.  They can restrict public access to 
the land: obviously if no-one can access the land, then the goods cannot be reduced 
into the possession of another.77  Parker v British Airways Board provides the other 
option for landowners: express a manifest intention to exclude others.78  So whether 
or not the land on which the goods lay is open to public access will determine the 
strength of the claim of the occupier; if there is public access then the occupier has to 
display a manifest intention to possess all goods on the land. 
 
The clarity of this approach to determining ownership masks an underlying conflict of 
principles.  A balance must be drawn between the principle that the owner of land 
intends to own all the goods on that land, and the principle that property in goods is 
initially deemed to lie with the finder.  The problem of finding an appropriate balance 
between these principles is illustrated by the different approaches in R v William 
Rowe,79 and R v William White.80  In Rowe it was held that a canal company had 
property in iron that had lain on the bottom of the canal for some time, on the basis of 
the general principle that land owners own all goods on their land.  Over fifty years 
later, in William White, there were similar facts.  The Court of Criminal Appeal 
quashed a conviction for stealing pig iron, which had been found on the side of a 
                                               
75
 See eg South Staffordshire Water Co v Sharman [1896] 2 QB 44; The Title of the Finder (1899) 33 
ILT 225; Wiley v Synan (1937) 57 CLR 200; Grafstein v Holme [1958] 12 DLR (2d) 727. 
76
 See eg Elwes v Brigg Gas Company (1886) 33 ChD 562; South Staffordshire Water Co v Sharman 
[1896] 2 QB 44; City of London Corporation v Appleyard [1963] 2 All RE 834; Moffatt v Kazana 
[1969] 2 QB 152; Waverley BC v Fletcher [1996] QB 334; Gray and Gray, above n 69, [1.2.70]-
[1.2.71]. 
77
 See eg R v Woodman [1974] QB 754; Simester and Sullivan, p 458. 
78
 [1982] QB 1004.  See also Munday v Australian Capital Territory (1998) 146 FLR 17. 
79
 (1859) Bell 93; 169 ER 1180. 
80
 (1912) 7 Cr App R 266. 
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canal.  IWZDVVDLGWKDWLIWKHLURQµKDGEHHQDWVRPHWLPHLQWKHEHGRIWKHFDQDOLWPD\
ZHOOKDYHEHHQDEDQGRQHGE\WKHRZQHU¶81  Lord Alverstone CJ acknowledged the 
challenge that courts face: that fact that goods are simply lying on the ground as much 
demonstrates that such goods are abandoned as it demonstrates their mere loss.82  The 
distinctions between the cases extend, importantly, to the grounds for appeal in either 
case.  In Rowe the task for the Court was to determine whether the canal company had 
a sufficient interest in the goods to maintain an indictment for larceny, whereas in 
William White the focus was on whether the finder had sufficient intention to be 
convicted.83  Thus in William White LWZDVVDLGWKDWLIµthe property had been 
abandoned, the person charged has a right to have the jury directed that if he took it 
UHDOO\EHOLHYLQJWKDWLWZDVDEDQGRQHGKHLVQRWJXLOW\RIODUFHQ\¶84  This illustrates 
that the real problem for finders charged with theft is not necessarily whether the 
property is abandoned.  Rather, the issue is whether or not the finder is honest, based 
on his actual belief. 
 
The importance of a finder¶VEHOLHIRUKRQHVW\LVHYLGHQWLQWKHGHFLVLRQVLQHibbert v 
McKiernan,85 and R v Rostron.86  In Hibbert the defendant had been arrested at a golf 
club and was found to be in possession of eight golf balls, which he had picked up on 
the course.  One of the balls had a distinctive mark which corresponded to a ball lost 
by a member of the club three days previously.  The defendant was charged with theft 
FRQWUDU\WRVHFWLRQRIWKH/DUFHQ\$FW,QWKH'LYLVLRQDO&RXUWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
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conviction was upheld.  LRUG*RGGDUG&-VWDWHGWKDWWKH&RXUWµQHHGQRWEHWURXEOHG
ZLWKQLFHTXHVWLRQV¶UHODWLQJWRRZQHUVKLS87  Hickey rightly argues that such an 
approach is mistaken, and that the best interpretation of this case is the simplest one: 
that the members of the club had sufficient possessory interest to maintain a charge of 
larceny.88  However, the facts of this case and the tenor of the judgements of Lord 
Goddard CJ and Humphreys J also LQGLFDWHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
intention, with particular reference to the absence of claim of right on the part of the 
defendant.  ,QWKHKHDGQRWHWRWKH.LQJ¶V%HQFK5HSRUWVLWLVVtated that the defendant 
µVWDWHGWKDWKHNQHZKHKDGQRULJKWWRWDNHWKHP¶.89  Lord Goddard CJ said that the 
Court was  
 
µGHDOLQJZLWK«DWKLHIZKRWRRNWKHEDOOVDQLPRIXUDQGLQRWZLWKDKRQHVW
PDQ«(YHU\KRXVHKROGHURURFFXSLHURIODQGPHDQVRULQWHQGs to exclude 
thieves and wrongdoers from the property occupied by him, and this confers 
on him a special property in goods found on his land sufficient to support an 
indictment if the goods are taken therefrom, not under a claim of right, but 
with a felonious intent¶90 
 
Humphreys J provided a similar rationale: 
 
µthe appellant, after giving a false name and address and denying that he was 
in possession of any golf balls, had when found in possession of eight of them 
admitted that he knew he had no right to take them.  He therefore, as the 
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justices found, acted fraudulently, without any claim of right and with the 
intention of permanently depriving the owners of their property.¶91   
 
In Rostron, the defendants had been caught by the police, dressed in scuba diving 
gear, with DEDJRIµYHU\ZHWJROIEDOOV¶92  They had used their diving experience to 
collect golf balls that had been lost into water hazards, apparently earning up to 
£30,000 a year from selling such balls.93  As Hickey has noted, the Court of Appeal in 
Rostron failed to take into account certain material differences of fact between the 
case before them and Hibbert (which they took as governing the situation).94  That 
analysis is not disputed.  However, it is further suggested that as with Hibbert the 
defendants in Rostron had their convictions upheld as much by reference to their 
dishonesty as by reference to the proprietary status of the balls.  The defendants 
claimed the golf balls they had were in fact taken from a golf course in Lancashire 
(rather than the one they were at, in Leicester),95 clearly demonstrating an evasive 
DWWLWXGHRQWKHGHIHQGDQWV¶SDUWLIQRWRXWULJKWGLVKRQHVW\  Mantell LJ (giving the sole 
judgement of the Court) considered the issue of honesty.  He stated it was sufficient 
(inGHHGµPRUHIDYRXUDEOHWKDQLWQHHGHGWREH¶WRWHOOWKHMXU\DVWKHWULDOMXGJHKDG 
 
µthat the prosecution had to prove that the defendant whose case was being 
considered knew that he was not entitled to go on to the golf course and 
remove golf balls.  If that was established, then the necessary element of 
dishonesty had been proved, and, of course, if that were the case it would 
matter not what other people might think, because he could not in such 
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circumstances have had an honest belief that he was entitled to do what he 
did.¶96 
 
Hooper and Ormeord have noted that the fact the defendant in Rostron had 
µNQRZOHGJHWKDWKHKDGQR³ULJKW´DQGQRSHUPLVVLRQWRDFWLQWKLVZD\PHUHO\
PHDQWKHKDGQRSRVVLEOHGHIHQFHXQGHU¶VHFWLRQVDDQGE>LHthose relating 
WRDFODLPRIULJKW@¶,QGHHGWKHIDFWWKHGHIHQGDQWµDOVRDUJXHGWKDWKHVDZQRKDUP
in fishing for the balls, given that nobody else seemed interested in recovering them, 
and this surely entitled him to a Ghosh direction, especially since his case appears to 
KDYHHOLFLWHGFRQVLGHUDEOHSXEOLFV\PSDWK\DWWKHWLPH¶97  In commenting on Hibbert 
v McKiernan*ULHZQRWHGWKDWµ6XFKDVFDYHQJHUQRGRXEWVWHDOVXQGHUWKHSUHVHQW
ODZ%XWWKHFOXE¶V³FRQWURO´RIWKHEDOOVZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRIVHction 5(1) can 
KDUGO\GHSHQGRQWKHIDFWRIWUHVSDVV¶98  Yet for Mantell LJ the fact of trespass 
appears to have been conclusive of the issue.  The fact of trespass (in addition to the 
misleading statements by the defendants at the time of their arrest) meant that the 
GHIHQGDQWV¶ belief about the abandoned nature of the golf balls was not an honest one.  
Thus it becomes clear that in assessing whether theft has occurred, the issue of 
abandonment can go as much to the intention element of the offence as it does to any 
other.  This is of particular importance for freegan bin-divers, as it begins to illustrate 
the effect of their belief about the proprietary status of the goods they find in bins.  
This issue of dishonesty is analysed further below.99 
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(ii) Abandonment by disposal as rubbish 
In R v Edwards and Stacey,100 three pigs had been bitten by a mad dog and in order to 
prevent the pork entering the food chain the owner of the pigs ordered two of his 
employees to bury the pigs.  However, they later dug up the carcasses and disposed of 
them for their own profit.  It was held that the pigs had not been abandoned, and so 
they were convicted of larceny.  The rationale behind this conclusion appears to have 
two elements.  First, the owner demonstrated an intention to retain control over the 
goods, and second, the public policy ground of preventing risks to public health.101  
These aspects of the case separate it from freegan bin-diving, as owners of rubbish 
generally do not demonstrate an intention to retain control over the goods, and the 
risks to public health from bin-diving are minimal.102 
 
In Williams v Phillips,103 the defendants were refuse-collectors working for the local 
authority.  They appropriated property that had been placed in bins as rubbish for 
collection by the authority.  Their conviction for larceny was upheld.  According to 
the Court of Appeal, the owners had put the rubbish in the bins with the specific 
intention of transferring the property in the rubbish to the authority (presumably upon 
collection by the authority).  That was the only allowable interference with the 
rubbish, thus the goods were not abandoned.  Lord Goddard CJ stated that putting 
rubbish out for collection was not abandonment.  His speech is worth referring to in 
full: 
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µ,I,SXWUHIXVHLQPy dustbin outside my house, I am not abandoning it in the 
sense that I am leaving it for anybody to take it away.  I am putting it out so 
that it may be collected and taken away by the local authority, and until it has 
been taken away by the local authority it is my property.  It is my property and 
I can take it back and prevent anybody else from taking it away.  It is simply 
put there for the Corporation or the local authority, as the case may be, to 
come and clear it away.  Once the Corporation come and clear it away, it 
seems to me that because I intended it to pass from myself to them, it becomes 
their property.  Therefore, there is no ground for saying that this is abandoned 
SURSHUW\$VORQJDVWKHSURSHUW\UHPDLQVRQWKHRZQHU¶VSUHPLVHVLWFDQQRW
be abandoned property.  It is a wholly untenable proposition to say that refuse 
which a householder puts out to be taken away is abandoned.  Very likely he 
does not want it himself and that is why he puts it in the dustbin.  He puts it in 
the dustbin, not so that anybody can come along and take it, but so that the 
&RUSRUDWLRQFDQFRPHDORQJDQGWDNHLW¶104 
 
Thus Reed and Fitzpatrick state that  
 
µZKHUHKRXVHKROGHUVWKURZUXEELVKLQWRDGXVWELQIRUFROOHFWLRQE\WKH
corporation, they have in a sense abandoned the property; but not for the 
purposes of theft.  This does not give the public the right to rummage through 
the bin to see if there is anything worth taking.  Thus even in a situation where 
the householder is expected to place his dustbin in the street outside his house 
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for collection, if X, a passerby, or even the dustman, takes anything from the 
ELQWKHUHLVDSULPDIDFLHFDVHRIWKHIWIURPWKHKRXVHKROGHU¶105   
 
Hudson provides an even broader interpretation, arguing that when someone puts 
rubbish in a bLQWKHUXEELVKµLVLQWHQGHGIRUWKHORFDODXWKRULW\DQGWKHKRXVHKROGHU
FDQWDNHLWEDFNDQGSUHYHQWDQ\RQHHOVHWDNLQJLWDZD\¶106  This certainly it locks in 
WKHQRWLRQWKDWDEDQGRQPHQWLVQRWVRPHWKLQJWREHµOLJKWO\LQIHUUHG¶107  Furthermore, 
it is arguable that the functional similarity between freegan bin-diving and the actions 
of the defendant in Williams v Phillips is so great (greater than the similarity with 
Edwards and Stacey) that by reason of analogy freegans must be guilty of theft.  It is 
suggested though that such an argument is mistaken. 
 
As was noted at the outset of this article,108 the arguments on environmental or 
privacy grounds fail to properly cover freegan bin-diving.  Thus, like with Edwards 
and Stacey, Williams v Phillips does not provide satisfactory grounds for convicting 
freegan bin-divers of theft if the decision is predicated on privacy concerns.  Perhaps 
more importantly, in both cases the decisions appeared to be predicated on the 
particular status of the defendants as employees.  In Edwards and Stacey they were 
specifically ordered by their employer not to dig up the pig carcass.  In Williams v 
Phillips the defendants were contracted (via an agreement between the union of which 
they were members and the employing authority) to give up any items found in the 
rubbish to their employer to be divided equally between the employer and employees.  
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They were also informed that failure to follow this condition would lead to criminal 
prosecution.  So in doing the particular acts the defendants in both cases were 
deliberately and knowingly going outside their authority and breaching expressly-
stated conditions set out by their employers.109  However, freeganism appears to rest 
on a different set of circumstances.  A freegan will be obtaining property that he 
believes is abandoned; he has not been specifically told that he cannot take the 
property as his own.  It is arguable that neither case provides conclusive guidance as 
to the criminal liability of a freegan. 
 
It could thus be suggested that if someone wishes to avoid their rubbish being seen as 
abandoned and then taken by a freegan, they should simply imposes clear notices 
SHUKDSVIROORZLQJ/RUG'HQQLQJ¶VµrHGKDQG¶WHVW110) that the goods in the bins is not 
in fact abandoned and that no one (apart from the collection agency) has a right to the 
goods.  In such cases there will be a sufficiently manifested intention to exclude 
others as to show that there is no abandonment.  Yet a freegan may still have 
difficulty in proving the goods were abandoned in the absence of such labelling.  
Although there are strong arguments in favour of allowing bin-diving, and the 
arguments in favour criminalising of bin-diving are based on factors that are either not 
present or are irrelevant to the case of a freegan bin-diver, the case law on 
abandonment is too opaque to allow for a clear assessment of the criminal status of a 
freegan bin-diver.  If a freegan takes goods out of bin that is found at the back of a 
building, regardless of whether the building contains a supermarket, restaurant, 
private house or offices, it is possible that the goods have not been abandoned.  The 
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decisions in Edwards and Stacey, Williams v Phillips, Woodman, and Parker v British 
Airways Board, Hibbert v McKiernan and Rostron all seem to suggest (for various 
reasons) that a bin-diver would be liable for theft in such a situation.  However, the 
fact the goods have been thrown out as rubbish may bring in the powerful argument 
about value, illustrated in cases such as Peters, Bentinck Ltd v Cromwell Engineering 
Co and Stewart v Gustafson.  Most importantly though, the conflict between the 
decisions in Rowe and William White, seen in the light of Hibbert v McKiernan and 
RostronLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHIXQGDPHQWDOLVVXHLVWKHIUHHJDQ¶VLQWHQWLRQKis honest 
belief.  It seems that the best approach for a freegan bin-diver is to cast doubt on his 
dishonesty, rather than attempt the conceptually and practically difficult task of 
proving the goods were actually abandoned. 
(b) Dishonesty111 
Although the concept of dishonesty has a major role in determining whether theft has 
been committed,112 it LVµSHFXOLDUO\GLIILFXOWWRGHILQH¶113  The Theft Act 1968 only 
provides examples of what is not dishonest.  Section 2 of that Act provides that an act 
is not dishonest if there is (1) appropriation in the belief that you have in law the right 
to deprive the owner of the goods, (2) appropriation in the belief that the owner would 
consent if he knew of the appropriation and the surrounding circumstances, and (3) 
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appropriation in the belief that the owner cannot be discovered by reasonable steps. 
Beyond this the courts have provided some help, primarily the provision of the two 
part Ghosh test that provides for both a subjective and an objective assessment of the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VVtate of mind. 
 
5HFRJQLWLRQWKDWDWKHIWFRQYLFWLRQZLOOWXUQRQWKHDOOHJHGWKLHI¶VGLVKRQHVW\UDLVHV
this deceptively simple question: are freegans dishonest?  This question assumes 
greater significance in the light of the difficulties faced by a freegan who claims 
merely that the goods were abandoned.  So although µWKHLPPXQLW\DFFRUGHGWRWKH
pure finder appears to rest upon the ground of reasonable and probable cause of 
EHOLHI¶,114 pDUWLFXODUSUREOHPVDULVHIURPWKHDZNZDUGIDFWWKDWZKLOVWDIUHHJDQ¶V
conduct PD\SURYLGHLQIHUHQFHVDERXWKLVOHYHORIKRQHVW\LWLVWKHIUHHJDQ¶Vstate of 
mind upon which his level of honesty must rest.115  Furthermore this assessment of the 
IUHHJDQ¶VVWDWHRIPLQGLVDIIHFWHGE\WKHRSHUDWLRQRIGLVKRQHVW\DVDµFRQFHSW
deVFULELQJWKHZURQJGRQHUHTXLULQJDPRUDOHYDOXDWLRQIURPWKHMXU\¶116  
Nevertheless, it is suggested that a careful analysis of freeganism and the 
jurisprudence on dishonesty indicates that freegans are not dishonest. 
 
The following discussion will consider the specific situation of a freegan bin-diver.  
There is an assessment of whether a freegan can protect himself by setting up a claim 
of right, which requires a discussion of the potential effects of a moral claim as 
opposed to a legal claim of right.117  Next there is consideration of whether a freegan 
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bin-GLYHUFDQDUJXHWKDWKHKDGDQKRQHVWEHOLHIWKDWKHKDGWKHRZQHU¶VFRQVHQW118  
This element of the discussion will be shown to be strongly correlated to the presence 
of a belief in whether the goods have been abandoned.  There will be a brief analysis 
of the potential of a claim that the owner of goods cannot be discovered, which will 
necessarily be focused on freegan bin-diving of public bins.119  The final aspect of the 
discussion will consider the implications of the Ghosh test for dishonesty,120 where it 
will be shown that the Ghosh test provides a valuable method by which a freegan can 
avoid a theft conviction.  It will be shown that in the context of a freegan bin-diver, 
many of the doubts about the Ghosh test famously raised by Edward Griew are 
ultimately not objectionable, and that the strongest conclusion is that freegan bin-
divers are neither objectively nor subjectively dishonest. 
(i) Belief in the right to deprive 
If a defendant in a theft case has aSSURSULDWHGWKHJRRGVµin the belief that he has in 
law the right to deprive the other of it¶LWLVQRWDGLVKRQHVWDSSURSULDWLRQ121  As 
stated, the right must be a legal right,122 not just a moral one.123  The need for a belief 
in a legal right appears to derive from the general principle that taking property 
without consent is unjustifiable even if done to prevent starvation.124  The belief in a 
legal right does not have to be reasonable or even exist though;125 an honest belief 
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will suffice (and this is so for tKHRWKHUWZR³EHOLHI´GHIHQFHVGLVFXVVHGEHORZ
although it must be accepted that the reasonableness of the belief could impact upon 
the honesty of the belief.126   
 
It is suggested that DIUHHJDQFRXOGDUJXHIRUH[DPSOHWKDWWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V
international treaty obligations concerning environmental protection give them the 
right to reduce the impact of waste.  In September 2008 a number of Greenpeace 
protestors were charged with causing criminal damage by painting on a chimney stack 
in protest at the 3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VDOOHJHGIDLOXUHWRGHDOZLWKHQYLURQPHQWDOLVVXHV127  
,QWKDWFDVHWKHLVVXHZDVZKHWKHUWKHSURWHVWRUVKDGDµODZIXOH[FXVH¶DVSHUWKH
Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1), rather than whether they were dishonest.  
Nevertheless, there appears to be a functional similarity between the two defences, 
and the acquittal of the Greenpeace protestors raises the possibility that a jury may be 
swayed by a freegan claiming that his bin-diving activities were in fact based on a 
legal right to prevent environmental harm. 
 
Other claims of a right to deprive the owner of the goods may arise, yet they may just 
be moral rights.  Will such claims have any effect?  For one, a freegan may claim that 
he has a right to take the goods on general environmental grounds (as opposed to the 
specific legal obligations as noted above).  The environmentalist rationale for 
freeganism would appear to bear this out as a strong possibility.128  Alternatively, as 
Hudson has argued, where µDQRZQHUZKRKDVIRUDOOSUDFWLFDOSXUSRVHV abandoned his 
SURSHUW\>DQG@WKHQ>FKDQJHV@KLVPLQGDQG>VHHNV@WRUHFRYHULW³ZKHQKHZLOO´ [there 
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is an infliction of] injustice on occupants who might have had very good reason to 
suppose that the property was abandoned and good moral right to treat LWDVWKHLUV¶129  
Clearly the strict statutory restriction of such claims to legal rights would appear to 
make either claim irrelevant.  Yet common sense strongly suggests that a freegan 
making a moral claim should not automatically be deemed dishonest.  Arguments as 
to belief in moral rights may well become important if the freegan bin-diver claims 
that he honestly believed that what he was doing was not dishonest because of those 
beliefs in moral rights.  Such a dispute would be solved by recourse to the Ghosh test 
for dishonesty, discussed below.130  Thus it is arguable that a belief in a mere moral 
ULJKWLVµQRWnecessarily¶H[FOXGHG131 because the use of juries to determine 
dishonesty.  Jurors may well be swayed by the effect of such honest beliefs, and thus 
belief in a moral right may achieve the same status as a belief in a legal right, but via a 
different test for (dis)honesty.132   
(ii) Belief that the owner consents 
,IDIUHHJDQZHUHWRWDNHJRRGVµLQWKHEHOLHIWKDWKHZRXOGKDYHWKHRWKHU¶VFRQVHQWLI
the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it¶WKHQKHZRXOGQRWEH
dishonest.133  7KHDLPRIWKLVSURYLVLRQLVWRSUHFOXGHµVLOO\SURVHFXWLRQV¶, such as 
ZKHUHVRPHRQHWDNHVWKHLUIODWPDWH¶VPLONIRUDFXSRIWHD134  It seems obvious that 
someone who throws out rubbish will not care about whether it is picked up by 
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someone else.135  A freegan bin-diver may believe that since the original owner has 
disposed of the goods as rubbish, then that owner would consent to anyone (thus 
including the freegan) taking the goods away.  Ease of access to the bin, and the ease 
of entry into the bin, will be determining factors in the assessment of whether the 
belief is a genuine one, in the sense that a freegan who sees a bin with a big red cross 
DQGDVLJQVD\LQJµNHHSRXW¶ZLOOKDYHGLIILFXOW\LQGHYHORSLQJWKHQHFHVVDU\JHQXLQH
belief in consent.  What this illustrates is a connection between the tests for ownership 
and dishonesty in the offence of theft: those factors which determine whether or not 
goods are considered abandoned will also help determine the presence of dishonesty. 
 
An interesting problem may arise if a freegan claims the benefit of this defence on the 
grounds that the owner of the goods in the bin (say, a supermarket) stated that whilst 
it would consent to its waste goods being taken by a freegan, it would not consent to a 
freegan taking them from the bin itself.  This claim by the owner may well be 
justifiable as an expression of a risk-management policy with regard to liability 
should a freegan get injured in the course of the bin-diving.  This situation may 
present an insurmountable challenge for a freegan, as his practical experience as a 
bin-diver will no doubt have demonstrated to him at least the potential for injury, and 
thus a jury may conclude that this amount of knowledge would suffice to show that 
his belief that the owner would consent was not an honest belief.   
                                               
135
 See above, text accompanying n 23.  The owner may have concerns if the rubbish contained 
confidential information, though as noted earlier (see above, text accompanying n 20) this issue will 
not arise in the case of a freegan bin-diver. 
 35 
(iii) Belief that the owner cannot be found using 
reasonable means 
If DIUHHJDQµappropriates the property in the belief that the person to whom the 
property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps¶WKHQKHZLOOEHQRW
be dishonest.136  An honest belief will suffice: it does not need to be reasonable.137  
This defence will, prima facie, be of little use for a freegan who obtains goods by bin-
diving.  In such cases, whether the bin belongs to an individual or a commercial 
organisation, it seems implausible that unreasonable means would be required to find 
WKHRZQHURISURSHUW\SODFHGLQVXFKELQV$QLQGLYLGXDO¶VELQZLWKD house number 
RQLWIRUH[DPSOHRUDVXSHUPDUNHW¶VELQORFDWHGRQWKHSUHPLVHVZLOOFOHDUO\VLJQDO
the identity of the person who put the goods in the bin.  Really in such cases a freegan 
claiming that he is not dishonest will be best placed to found his argument on a 
different aspect of the law on dishonesty.   
 
+RZHYHUZKHQWKHVLWXDWLRQLQYROYHVµXQLGHQWLILDEOH¶JRRGV a freegan may well be 
able to effectively bring up this defence.  This may well be the case with regard to 
rubbish found in a public bin (or rubbish found lying on land).  To find out who the 
µRZQHU¶LVLQVXFKFDVHVmay well involve unreasonable means.  As Ormerod and 
Williams have noted, the application and interpretation of this provision depends 
heavily on the particular circumstances of the case.138  Certainly, in the old case of R v 
ThurbornZKHUHWKHLVVXHFRQFHUQHGWKHUHDVRQDEOHQHVVRIWKHILQGHU¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKH
RZQHURIDEDQNQRWHFRXOGEHIRXQGµHYLGHQFHRI>WKHILQGHU¶V@SUHYLRXV
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acquaintance with the ownership of the particular chattel, the place where it is found, 
RUWKHQDWXUHRIWKHPDUNVXSRQLW¶ZRXOGEHLQSRLQW139  Although the modern law 
imposes merely an honesty test on the belief, such factors would affect whether the 
finding of the owner would require unreasonable means.  The presence of identifying 
marks would suggest that identification of the owner could be reasonably achieved.  
+RZHYHULWFRXOGEHDUJXHGWKDWWKHLGHDRIWKHILQGHUVµSUHYLRXVDFTXDLQWDQFHZLWK
WKHRZQHUVKLS¶RIWKHJRRGVFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVallowing a freegan to argue that 
because he had an honest belief that the goods were abandoned, he also honestly 
believed that identification of the owner would be unreasonable.  This argument could 
UHVWRQWKH³YDOXHRIWKHJRRGV´DSSURDFKWRGHWHUPLQLQJwhether goods are 
abandoned,140 as the reasonableness of means used to find the owner will be inversely 
related to the value of the goods.  Thus a freegan could argue that the presence of the 
goods in the bin demonstrates their low value, and the difference between the low 
value of the goods and the high cost of finding an owner would make such action 
unreasonable.  
(iv) The Ghosh test 
In Feely,141 the Court of Appeal held that if the accused acted in a way which 
offended the sensibilities of the ordinary decent person,142 he would be dishonest.  
This test was expanded by the Court of Appeal in Ghosh:143 in addition to the Feely 
test, if the accused honestly believed that his actions were not dishonest according to 
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the standards of ordinary decent people, then there was no dishonesty.  The full test 
can be set out like this:144 µZDVZKDWZDVGRQHGLVKRQHVWDFFRUGLQJWRWKHRUGLQDU\
VWDQGDUGVRIUHDVRQDEOHDQGKRQHVWSHRSOH"¶µ0XVWWKHGHIHQGDQWKDYHUHDOLVHG
that what he was doing was dishonest according to those sWDQGDUGV"¶7KLVWHVWVKRXOG
only be put to the jury if the defendant himself raises the possibility that he did not 
consider his conduct to be dishonest according to the ordinary standards of reasonable 
and honest people.145   
 
Assessing whether something is dishonest according to the ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honesty people will obviously depend upon the facts of the case.  It 
may be argued that a freegan who goes bin-diving in the dead of night is by his 
behaviour being dishonest.  A lay person (and, indeed, a lawyer) may well ask with all 
UHDVRQDEOHQHVVµ,IKHZDVKRQHVWZK\GRHVKHQRWJRDQGELQ-dive in the middle of 
WKHGD\"¶Certainly, if someone takes goods in a blatant and open manner in the 
daytime, as in R v Wood, then there is strong evidence of an absence of dishonesty.146  
The advice for freegans would seem to be that they should be open about their 
behaviour.147   Yet such is the nature of British seasons, there may well be total 
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GDUNQHVVDWWKUHHR¶FORFNLQWKHDIWHUQRRQLQPLG-winter), or it may not get dark until 
gone eleven at night (in mid-summer).    Thus it can be seen that bin-diving may well 
occur in the dark, but for reasons that have little to do with dishonesty.  The failure to 
retain a distinction between offences that occur at different points in the day in the 
Theft Act 1968, when there was such a distinction in the previous law,148 strongly 
suggests that such facts should not impact upon the dishonesty test.149  Yet it does 
appear that the timing of the taking can have a significant impact on determining the 
level of honesty.  A clear comparison can be made between Rostron,150 where the 
defendants were collecting golf balls in the middle of the night and were found to 
have been dishonest, and Wood, which involved a taking in the middle of the day. 
 
,WDSSHDUVWKDWWKHSXUSRVHRIWHVWLQJDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VGLVKRQHVW\DJDLQVWWKHordinary 
standards of reasonable and honest people is to provide a solution to a problem of fair 
labelling ± should there be criminalisation of people who commit acts that are 
technically thefts, but the nature of the act is such that ordinary people would not 
FRQVLGHUWKHPWREHD³thief´?  In Feely Lawton LJ VWDWHGWKDWµDWDNLQJWRZKLFKQR
moral obloquy can reasonably attach is not within the concept of stealing either at 
FRPPRQODZRUXQGHUWKH7KHIW$FW¶151  +LV/RUGVKLSIROORZHGZLWKWKLVµ:H
find it impossible to accept that a conviction for stealing, whether it be called larceny 
or theft, can reveal no moral obloquy.  A man so convicted would have difficulty in 
persuading his friends and neighbours that his reputation had not been gravely 
damaged.  He would be bound to be lowered in the estimation of right thinking 
                                                                                                                                      
LQDQµRSHQDQGQRWRULRXV¶PDQQHUFLWLQJBurroughs Adding Machine Co v Bivens-Corhn Co (1941) 
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148
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SHRSOH¶152  This approach thus gives rise to the following question: is there a 
sufficient moral obloquy about freeganism to justify a theft conviction?153 
 
In his famous denunciation of the dishonesty test formulated following Feely and 
Ghosh,154 Griew objected to the potential increase in the volume, the difficulty and 
the length of jury trials.155  However, if the issue that is to be determined is whether a 
defendant is dishonest, then there seems to be nothing wrong with requiring jury 
members to make that determination.  This is particularly so with regard to freegans.  
If it is accepted that there are at least strong doubts over the value of pursuing a theft 
FRQYLFWLRQIRUEHKDYLRXUVXFKDVIUHHJDQLVPWKDWPD\DWWUDFWPLQLPDOLIDQ\µPRUDO
REORTX\¶156 then there cannot be serious problems with letting a jury determine 
whether an individuDO¶VFRQGXFWLQGLFDWHVWRXVH*ULHZ¶VRZQZRUGVµD
WHPSHUDPHQWDOIODZEXWQRWDPRUDORQH¶157  The real problem is whether the jury will 
see a temperamental flaw, such as the willingness to obtain food for consumption 
from bins, and believe they have evidHQFHRIµPRUDOREORTX\¶EHFDXVHRIWKHLUOHYHORI
disgust.  The possibility of this occurring can be presumed on the basis of comments 
to an article on freeganism on the BBC News website.  The following are three 
different comments made which clearly indicate a negative view of freeganism which 
is founded primarily on the notions of disgust: 
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µ)UHHJDQVDUHVXFKK\SRFULWV<RXFDQDIIRUGWREX\WKHIRRG\HWFKRRVHQRW
to, so it's thrown out, then you scrub through a bin for it.  You may as well be 
stealing LWIURPWKHVKRS<RX¶UHFDXVLQJWKHZDVWHE\QRWEX\LQJWKHIRRGLQ
the first place.  Sounds like a poor excuse for being tight fisted to me, not a 
SURWHVWDJDLQVWVXSHUPDUNHWV¶ 
 
µ6FURXQJHUV:K\GRQ¶WWKH\JRLQWRWKHVWRUHDQGORRNIRUWKHUHGXFHd items 
that will end up in the bin and BUY IT!  Strewth everybody wants something 
for nothing.  I bet if this lot hurt themselves whilst getting the food they'll sue 
WKHVXSHUPDUNHWV¶ 
 
µ<RXFDQMXVWLI\LWDOO\RXOLNH<RXFDQVXJDUFRDWLW%XWLW¶V EATING 
)520$%,1¶158 
  
The level of disgust one might feel about eating food from a bin is clearly linked into 
the conceptualisation of rubbish and waste as a bad thing.  In her excellent analysis of 
the American approach to rubbish Strasser noted the turn from viewing scavengers in 
19th century America in a sympathetic light to seeing them as being closely 
connected to criminal activity.159   Likewise the development of various social, 
charitable and governmental provisions in 19th century America was accompanied by 
commentators reporting their disgust at children picking over rubbish for salvageable 
goods,160 with particular emphasis on the link between poverty and squalor as 
opposed to the developing sanitation and hygiene regime.161  Thus began the 
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depersonalisation and the industrialisation of waste disposal, and arguably the 
crystallisation of the link between disgust and rubbish.162  Yet the whole point of 
freegan bin-diving for food is that this notion of disgust is essentially a societal 
creation resting on WKHJRRGV¶VWDWXVDVZDVWHUDWKHUWKDQWKHLUDFWXDOFRQGLWLRQµAt 
first the new scavenger is filled with disgust and self-loathing « That stage passes 
with experience ... He beings to understand: People throw away perfectly good stuff, a 
lot of perfectl\JRRGVWXII¶163  It can only be supposed that ingrained notions of 
disgust will inevitably feed through to the conceptually different notion of dishonesty.  
 
The possibility of inconsistent decisions,164 accompanying the obvious fiction of 
community norms of honesty,165 means a freegan will not be able to determine with 
any certainty whether a jury will find his actions honest.  Certainly there is the risk 
that the jury will consist of people for whom there is little distinction between disgust 
and dishonesty.  Nevertheless, the µJUHDWDVVXPSWLRQ¶WKDWWKHUHLVDVLQJXODUFRQFHSW
of dishonesty,166 PD\QRWSURYLGHDIDWDOEORZWRDIUHHJDQ¶VFKDQFHVRIVXFFHVV
Because µZHFDQQRORQJHUFRQILGHQWO\DVVHUWWKDWHYHU\MXURUZLOOKDYHDFFHVVWRD
uniform body of stanGDUGVZKHQLQWHUSUHWLQJGLVKRQHVW\¶,167 the possibility that jury 
members will consider bin-diving honest must also be accepted.  Indeed, there is a 
growing body of empirical evidence which suggests that jury members may well 
consider bin-diving to be an act which does not have sufficient moral obloquy to be 
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considered a criminal act.  In a recent paper by Green and Kugler,168 the views of first 
year law students at Rutgers School of Law (in Newark, New Jersey, USA) about the 
blameworthiness of different types of theftous conduct were assessed.  The students 
seemed to draw substantial differences between different types of theftous conduct.  
Unfortunately the students were not asked about freegan bin-diving, but the evidence 
demonstrated that they were willing to grade crimes according to their seriousness, 
with armed robbery the most serious, embezzlement n the middle, and failing to give 
up lost or mis-delivered goods as the least serious.  This does suggest that a jury faced 
with a bin-diving situation case might not consider such behaviour dishonest. 
 
,QDQRQJRLQJRQOLQHH[SHULPHQW)DILQVNLDQG)LQFKDUHDVVHVVLQJSHRSOH¶VUHVSRQVHV
to certain scenarios in order to provide evidence as to the provenance of a community 
notion of dishonesty.169  Preliminary results from the experiment indicate that honesty 
is a diverse standard, with evidence of different conceptions of dishonesty depending 
RQDJHDQGJHQGHU)XUWKHUPRUHµWKHUHDUHDQXPEHURIVFHQDULRVZKHUHWKH
UHVSRQGHQWVD\V³7KLVSHUVRQLVEHLQJGLVKRQHVW EXW,ZRXOGQRWFRQYLFWWKHP´
3UHVXPDEO\WKH\DUHUHIXVLQJWRFRQYLFWEHFDXVHWKH\GRQ¶WWKLQNZKDWWKHSHUVRQKDV
GRQHLV³WKDWEDG´¶170  It is suggested that if such views do prevail, then freeganism is 
just the sort of practice which would attract opprobrium, but only to the maximum 
H[WHQWRIEHLQJFRQVLGHUHG³GLVKRQHVW´ZLWKRXWKDYLQJVXIILFLHQWPRUDOREORTX\WREH
considered criminal. 
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If a freegan fails to convince a jury of their own subjective honesty then the objective 
element of the Ghosh test becomes relevant, and this gives rise to a problem over the 
potential validity (or the moral obloquy) RID³5RELQ+RRG´GHIHQFH,QGhosh, Lord 
Lane CJ stated that it would be dishonest for a defendant to act in a way he knows 
ordinary persons would consider dishonest, even if he honestly believes he is acting 
correctly (the two examples his Lordship gave were Robin Hood and an anti-
YLYLVHFWLRQLVWµEHFDXVHWKH\NQRZWKDWRUGLQDU\SHRSOHZRXOGFRQVLGHUWKHVHDFWLRQV
WREHGLVKRQHVW¶171  However, as Elliott noted, this would be ignoring the fact that it 
would still be a jury question; and that a jury may well decide in favour of Robin 
Hood.172  7KLVZDVDOVRRQHRI*ULHZ¶VREMHFWLRQVWRGhoshµ5RELQ+RRGPXVWEHD
thief even if he thinks the whole of the right-WKLQNLQJZRUOGLVRQKLVVLGH¶173  Yet is 
this actually the case?   
 
If theft is rationalised by reference to a broad conception of the harm principle 
operating as a mechanism for protecting a property right regime,174 then the odious 
nature of allowing a Robin Hood defence becomes clear.  So as Steel has noted, 
µ>D@lthough defendants might raise a lack of dishonesty to avoid conviction, the 
general community interest in maintaining the property regime means it is likely that 
such claims are viewed scepticall\E\MXULHV¶175  On the other hand, there is 
FRQVLGHUDEOHVWUHQJWKLQ6WHHO¶VWKHVLVWKDW such an approach overstates the importance 
of regime protection, and understates the necessity of some sort of felonious thought 
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on the part of the thief, ie dishonesty.176  On this foundation a Robin Hood defence 
becomes intelligible, if not actually legitimate.  The same logic would also hold with 
freeganism at a basic level, and it is at least arguable that there is even greater validity 
in defining freeganism as a non-WKHIWRXVDFWLRQEHFDXVHLQFRQWUDGLVWLQFWLRQWRµ5RELQ
+RRG¶FDVHV, freegans are taking goods that have been disposed of as rubbish (and not 
gold coins and crowns).177 
(c) The interaction between abandonment and dishonesty 
In dealing with cases involving (potentially) abandoned goods, the courts have 
generally failed to deal with the interconnections between abandonment and 
dishonesty (either in terms of the claim of right defences or the effect of the two-stage 
test for dishonesty developed in Feely and Ghosh).  At best this failure creates a 
considerable area of uncertainty in this part of the law.  At worst, it demonstrates an 
unwelcome disconnection of the actus reus of theft ie the taking of goods belonging 
to another, from the mens rea issue of honesty.  It is an important aspect of the 
dishonesty test that the alleged thief has his state of mind tested; this can be inferred 
from his conduct but conduct alone, without reference to the state of mind, cannot 
prove dishonesty.178  So the fact that a freegan has taken goods out of a bin should 
not, of itself, prove dishonesty.  Further to this it is arguable that if a freegan takes 
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goods in the belief (whether correct or not) that they have been abandoned he is 
operating under an honest belief.179 
 
The unwillingness of the courts to deal with this interaction between belief as to the 
provenance of the goods, and the level of honesty on the part of the accused, is clear 
in the golf balls cases.  To some extent the absence of discussion of the honesty issue 
in Hibbert v McKiernan is excusable as that case involved the offence of larceny, and 
the current law provides broader honesty-based defences for those accused of theft.  
This makes the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rostron somewhat less defensible 
though.  There the Court did consider the dishonesty issue, but in a rather desultory 
fashion consisting of only two paragraphs of analysis, based on the issue of a failure 
of the trial judge to provide a Ghosh direction.  The Court decided that the trial 
MXGJH¶VGLUHFWion was fair to the defendants, in that it asked whether they had taken 
the golf balls knowing that they were not entitled to go onto the golf course and take 
balls.  In this narrow sense this is probably correct.  But it really is a side-step from 
the issue of honesty, rather than taking the issue on.  The paucity of judicial guidance 
on the conflation of claims of abandonment and honest taking surely required some 
consideration of this matter. 
 
In spite of the confusion shown by the decisions in Hibbert v McKiernan and Rostron, 
it does appear that a freegan bin-diver may be able to show he is not dishonest, 
because of his honest belief that the goods are abandoned.  In R v Small,180 D had 
come across a car.  It had been in the same place for a fortnight.  It was unlocked, 
there was no fuel and the battery was flat.  After getting the car working again, D 
                                               
179
 Cf Griew [2.@DQKRQHVWEHOLHIWKDWJRRGVZHUHDEDQGRQHGFDQQHJDWLYHWKH³LQWHQWLRQWR
SHUPDQHQWO\GHSULYH´UHTXLUHPHQWRIWKHWKHIWRIIHQFH 
180
 [1987] Crim LR 777; (1988) 86 Cr App R 170. 
 46 
drove off in it.  He was arrested and charged with theft.  The car had been stolen, but 
'KRQHVWO\EHOLHYHGWKHFDUKDGEHHQµGXPSHG¶181  The Court of Appeal quashed his 
conviction.  It was held that the effect of William White,182 and (OOHUPDQ¶V:LOVRQ
Line Limited v Webster,183 ZDVWKDWµDQKRQHVWEHOLHIWKDWSURSerty was abandoned is a 
defence¶,184 and that this honest belief need not be a reasonable one.  
 
More recently, the Court of Appeal decided the case of R v Wood.185  There the 
defendant was convicted of theft.  He had taken the entire contents of a fabric shop.  
The shop had been operating until February 2000, when the two active partners had 
returned to Pakistan.  From that point on the shop did not operate.  The stock and 
other goods remained in the shop, and the third partner in the business occasionally 
checked the shop, but as a silent partner with a full-time occupation outside of this 
business the checking process was a minimal one. 
 
µ,WZDVLQWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKDWWKLVDSSHOODQWDQGKLVIULHQGZHQWWRWKH
shop on the evening of 15th August.  They cleared the entire shop, leaving 
nothing behind.  This was at least the fourth visit which the appellant had 
made there, because in earlier days, during daylight and on foot by himself 
with a shopping trolley, he had removed odd rolls of fabric from the shop and 
taken them home.  He admitted that he was a trespasser in the shop but said 
that he genuinely believed that everything in the shop had been abandoned 
property and that he was therefore not dishonest when he helped himself to it.  
He prayed in aid previous expeditions with the shopping trolley in broad 
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daylight without any interference as confirming him in the honesty of his 
EHOLHI¶186 
 
The Court held that a simple Ghosh direction was inappropriate, and that this type of 
case needed a direction that if the defendant had or might have had an honest belief 
that the goods were abandoned, then the jury would have to acquit.187  Application of 
the Ghosh WHVWLVµEHVWOHIW¶WRWKRVHFDVHVZKHUHWKHUHLVDFRQIOLFWDVWRZKDWLV
considered honest; the presence of an honest belief means Ghosh may be unhelpful.188  
So for a freegan bin-diver, provided he has an honest belief that the goods in a bin 
have been abandoned, based on the fact they are in the bin, the presence of such a 
belief may well provide a defence. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this article it has been established that freegans could have two defences to claims 
that they commit theft by bin-diving.  The first, that the goods are abandoned, has 
considerable intuitive value.189  It is difficult to see goods that have been disposed of 
as rubbish, as waste, as anything other than abandoned.  This is particularly so if an 
µHFRQRPLFYDOXH¶DSSURDFKDVH[SUHVVHGE\5ROIH%3ROORFNDQG:ULJKWDQG/RUG
Denning MR, is taken to assessing the possibility of abandonment.190  It is also 
important to acknowledge that the fact that property appears abandoned may well be 
evidence that it actually has been abandoned: courts must not fall into the trap of 
assuming that property cannot have been abandoned.  This point is illustrated by the 
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different approaches taken in Rowe and William White.191  Furthermore, those cases 
dealing directly with waste, Edwards and Stacey and Williams v Phillips, should be 
WUHDWHGZLWKFDUHDQGFDQSUREDEO\EHUHVWULFWHGE\YLUWXHRIWKHGHIHQGDQWV¶
HPSOR\PHQWE\WKHµYLFWLPV¶192  However, there are awkward problems with the law 
relating to abandonment.  Whilst it may be intuitive that rubbish is abandoned, the 
specific circumstances of each situation will be determinative of the issue of 
abandonment.  As Professor John Smith said in commenting on the Ghosh FDVHµ[t]he 
involvement of the law of theft with property concepts provides a fruitful source of 
fine and subtle distinctions, with plenty of scope for legitimate differences of 
RSLQLRQ¶193  However, this contextualism creates problems of certainty for freegans.   
 
The analysis of the case-law on abandonment, and in particular the decisions in 
Hibbert v McKiernan and Rostron,194 indicates that a significant determining factor in 
finding situations is the (dis)honesty of the finder.  It is submitted that a freegan will 
have a greater chance of defending himself against a charge of theft on the grounds he 
is not dishonest.  This may be counter-intuitive, as at first sight it is arguable that a 
freegan is acting dishonestly.  However, as has been shown, a more rational approach 
is to view freeganism as something that is not dishonest, either subjectively or 
objectively.  The impact of Ghosh, and the definition of dishonesty in the Theft Act 
1968, provides various opportunities for freegans to show that they are not dishonest, 
and are thus not thieves. 
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It is important to avoid putting words (or purposes) into the law of theft which do not 
EHORQJWKHUHDFFRUGLQJWR%ULGJH/-WKHFRXUWVVKRXOGµVKXQWKHWHPSWDWLRQZKLFK
sometimes presses on the mind of the judiciary to suppose that because a particular 
course of conduct ... was anti-social and undesirable, it can necessarily be fitted into 
some convenient criminal pigeon-KROH¶195  I think it is probably unlikely that Bridge 
LJ had the concept of freeganism at the top of his mind when he made this statement, 
but the applicability of the general principle it enunciates cannot be doubted.  
Freeganism covers behaviour, such as bin-diving, which portions of society may well 
find disgusting, possibly even anti-social.  Yet for those reasons alone certain 
behaviour cannot be criminalised.  There must surely be some harm involved.  And 
that is the crux of the matter.  Freegans cannot be understood as harming anyone.  
They are disposing of property that has already been deemed unworthy of retention or 
³appropriate´ commercial disposition.  To the extent that freegans reduce the potential 
costs of disposal of waste as landfill, or by incineration, it could well be argued that 
their behaviour is in fact harm-reducing, and as such should be lauded and not 
criminalised. 
 
The final point concerns the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wood.196  There the 
decision was clear: the defendant, who was essentially acting as a freegan, was not 
acting dishonestly.  It is submitted that when faced with instances of freeganism of 
abandoned goods (whether apparently or in actuality), the approach in Wood is far 
more appropriate than the approach taken in Rostron. 
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